

AMD External Secure Storage Using the PUF

XAPP1333 (v1.3) June 20, 2025

Summary

To store data in non-volatile memory (NVM) using an AMD Zynq™ UltraScale+™ device, data must be stored externally and should be encrypted if it is confidential. All Zynq UltraScale+ devices have a built-in physically unclonable function (PUF), which can generate a cryptographically strong, device-unique encryption key that can be used in combination with the built-in advanced encryption standard (AES) cryptographic core. This key cannot be read by a user, allowing for a heightened level of key security. Only if a Zynq UltraScale+ device is provisioned to store the PUF configuration information in eFUSEs and if Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Authentication is registered and enabled in eFUSEs, can the PUF's device-unique encryption key be used to encrypt and decrypt user data, which can then be stored and read from external non-volatile memory.


Download the [reference design files](#) for this application note from the AMD website. For detailed information about the design files, see [Reference Design](#).

Introduction

The PUF takes advantage of silicon variations unique to Zynq UltraScale+ devices to generate a device-unique encryption key that cannot be read by anyone, including the user. Along with generating a unique encryption key, the PUF also generates the required helper data so that the PUF can exactly regenerate the encryption key later. The details of the PUF are described in the *Zynq UltraScale+ Device Technical Reference Manual (UG1085)*. Normally, the PUF's encryption key, referred to as the Key Encryption Key (KEK), is used for encrypting a user's plain-text red key so that a user's red key can be stored encrypted in black key form in either eFUSEs or the boot header. The black encryption key is then decrypted using the PUF's KEK to generate the red key, which in turn is used for decrypting the boot information during secure boot. This use of the PUF is shown in the following figure.

-
- ★ **IMPORTANT!** *The PUF characterization results confirm that over the life of the device, the PUF is expected to reliably regenerate the KEK across all voltages and temperatures, assuming registration at a nominal voltage and temperature.*
-
- ★ **IMPORTANT!** *The RSA_EN eFUSE must be programmed to use the PUF's device-unique encryption key to encrypt and decrypt user data. Once this is programmed, boot header based authentication (bh_auth_enable) can no longer be used.*
-

Figure 1: Encrypting and Decrypting the Device Key Using PUF




When the PUF is registered in eFUSEs and RSA authentication is enabled in eFUSEs, documented in *Programming BBRAM and eFUSEs* (XAPP1319), the PUF’s device-unique encryption key can be used to encrypt and decrypt any user data. This encrypted data can then be stored externally to the Zynq UltraScale+ device, which is the focus of this application note. The RSA authentication settings cannot be stored in the boot header when using the PUF to encrypt and decrypt user data.

★ **IMPORTANT!** When the `RSA_ENABLE` eFUSEs are programmed, boot header authentication is no longer permitted.

The process of using the PUF to encrypt user data is shown in Figure 2 and works as follows: a user generates data that must be encrypted and appends an optional ID. This optional ID can be used to validate that the correct version of data is being used, such as when the data consists of encryption key information or configuration and is useful in preventing replay attacks. Even though the ID is optional, AMD highly recommends using it to ensure a more secure system. The optional ID enables key/data revocation as the user data packet can be revoked by burning one of the 256-bit user eFUSEs. Each of the 256-bit user eFUSEs can be mapped to 256 different 8-bit user IDs. User eFUSEs are a shared resource as the fuses could be used for Enhanced Key Revocation software, a tamper log (see *Developing Tamper-Resistant Designs with Zynq UltraScale+ Devices* (XAPP1323)), or any other user function.

Next, the PUF is enabled to regenerate the PUF’s device-unique encryption key, which is loaded into the AES cryptographic core to encrypt the data. AMD recommends minimizing the use of the PUF’s key by keeping the user data small or implementing an advanced key-rolling architecture where the PUF’s device-unique key is only used to encrypt the first portion of a larger sized data, thereby minimizing its exposure. This helps to avoid differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. After the encrypted data is written to external memory, the data is read back and decrypted to verify the process using the GCM authentication tag. If the data is authenticated, the user selected ID is safe to use. Conversely, if the data verification fails, a revocation penalty can take place, such as burning an associated user eFUSE.

Figure 2: Normal Encryption Process Using PUF




X26448-053025

Decrypting external data using the PUF is shown in the following figure and works as follows: the encrypted data packet is read from the external memory location followed by regeneration of the PUF decryption key. The data is then decrypted and authenticated via the GCM tag. If authentication passes and if the ID from the decrypted data has not been revoked in user eFUSEs, the data is valid and can be used. Conversely, if the GCM tag authentication fails, a penalty can be invoked and the decryption process could be stopped to avoid side channel attacks such as DPA. Furthermore, if the decryption process authenticates but the data’s ID has been revoked in user eFUSEs, the data is invalid and should not be used.



IMPORTANT! *The PUF KEK isn’t a FIPS legal key for storing data outside a cryptographic boundary. However, you can create a FIPS-legal KEK, encrypt the FIPS-legal KEK with the PUF KEK, store the encrypted FIPS-legal KEK in eFUSEs, and subsequently use the FIPS-legal KEK to store data outside the cryptographic boundary.*

Figure 3: Using the PUF for Decryption



X26418-061025

Hardware and Software Requirements

The hardware and software requirements for the reference systems are as follows:

- ZCU102 evaluation board
- AC power adapter (12 VDC)
- USB type-A to USB mini-B cable x 2
- Optional platform JTAG hardware and associated cables
- Secure Digital (SD) card formatted using the FAT file system
- AMD Vitis™ integrated design environment (Vitis IDE) 2021.2
- Required design files, which can be downloaded [here](#).

★ **IMPORTANT!** Programming any of the eFUSE settings noted in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Security eFUSES table in the Zynq UltraScale+ Device Technical Reference Manual (UG1085) precludes AMD test access. Consequently, AMD may not accept return material authorization (RMA) requests when these eFUSES are programmed.

Create a New Embedded Project for the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC

Perform the following steps to create a new embedded project for the AMD Zynq™ UltraScale+™ MPSoC. A brief description is covered in this section. Step-by-step instructions can be found in [Appendix A](#). For detailed elaboration on each step, refer to the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial (UG1209)*.

1. Open AMD Vivado™ Design Suite and create the hardware design required for the Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 evaluation board. The PL is not required for this lab so all the PS-PL interfaces are disabled and no bitstream is exported.
2. Export the hardware and launch Vitis IDE from within the Vivado Design Suite.
3. Create a platform project using the XSA file exported from Vivado. The platform projects automatically create the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform that includes standalone domain BSP, first stage boot loader projects called `zynqmp_fsbl` and `zynqmp_pmufw` along with their associated board support packages named `zynqmp_fsbl_bsp` and `zynqmp_pmufw_bsp` running respectively on the Arm® Cortex®-A53 processor in the APU domain and TMR MicroBaze processor in the PMU domain.
4. Build the platform, including `zynqmp_fsbl` and `zynqmp_pmufw`, by right-clicking on the **ZCU102_XAPP1333** platform and select **Project** → **Build Project** from the main menu.
5. Create a *HelloWorld* project to verify the hardware and software setup before proceeding.

Key Generation

Key generation is covered in detail in the Secure Boot section of *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial (UG1209)* so only a summary pertaining to this application note is documented here.

AES Key Generation

1. Create a new directory in the Vitis IDE workspace root directory (called `Keys`). The Vitis IDE root directory can be found at the same level as the `HelloWorld` folder.
2. Generate a device key and its associated IV, an operational key, and one partition block key and its associated IV.
3. Combine these keys and IVs into a file named `multiple_keys.nky`. Alternatively, copy the `Keys` folder found in the reference design documents to use for this lab or, if desired, use them as a template and insert your own key and IV values.

```
Device
zcu9eg;
Key 0
0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123;
IV
01DBD60260A7EC34DE5F6A494;
Key Opt
E070C542B6680A855724793A75222391E663CBD35F45D070F22F703A5CA31B45;
Key 1
0000000100000001000000010000000100000001000000010000000100000001;
IV 1      000000010000000100000001;
```

Encrypting the boot image is not required to use the PUF for encrypting user data. However, AMD highly recommends doing so, which is used throughout this application note.

 **IMPORTANT!** Be sure to use your own AES keys and associated IVs for operational devices. The keys provided in this lab are for demonstration purposes and are not cryptographically strong. Per the [NIST Special Publication \(SP\) 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode \(GCM\)](#), new IVs need to be used each time a key is used to encrypt new data. This means that if the boot image is updated, a new IV needs to be selected and provided to Bootgen.

RSA Asymmetric Key Generation

For this application note, generate a pair of RSA keys called `psk0.pem` and `ssk0.pem`. Alternatively, these keys are provided in the design documents in the Keys folder. RSA authentication is required to use the PUF for encrypting and decrypting user data.

 **RECOMMENDED:** While this application note does not require the use of a secondary key set, AMD highly recommends doing so in an operational application.

Generate SHA3 of Public RSA Asymmetric Key

Generate the associated SHA3 hash of the RSA PPK and name the output file `sha3.txt`. Alternatively, this hash can be found in the design documents in the `Keys` folder.

PUF eFUSE Configuration

 **IMPORTANT!** THESE INSTRUCTIONS MODIFY THE EFUSES ON THE ZCU102 DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND MAY LIMIT FUTURE USE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD FOR NON-SECURE TESTING AND DEBUGGING!


 **IMPORTANT!** Programming any of the noted eFUSE settings noted in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Security eFUSES table in the Zynq UltraScale+ Device Technical Reference Manual ([UG1085](#)) preclude AMD test access. Consequently, AMD might not accept return material authorization (RMA) requests. See the important note below the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Security eFUSES table in the Zynq UltraScale+ Device Technical Reference Manual ([UG1085](#)).

PUF eFUSE Settings

PUF registration is covered in detail in [Using the PUF in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial \(UG1209\)](#) so only a summary pertaining to this application note is documented here.

1. In the Vitis IDE workspace for this application note, right-click on the **platform.spr** that is located under the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform in the Explorer view and click **Open**.
2. Select **Board Support Package** under standalone on `psu_cortexa53_0` in the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform view and click **Modify BSP settings**.

Figure 4: Standalone BSP for PUF eFUSE Registration



- In the Supported Libraries, select **xilsecure** and **xilskey**.
- Click **OK** to close the window.
- Right-click the **ZCU102_XAPP1333** platform in the Explorer view, which is now marked out-of-date, and click **Build Project**.
- Select **Board Support Package** under standalone on psu_cortexa53_0 in the platform view that just opened and select the **Libraries** tab in the Operating Systems section.
- Scroll to the bottom of the Libraries tab and click **Import Examples** for the xilskey library.
- Check the **xilskey_puf_registration** example and click **OK**. This adds the associated project to your workspace.
- Open the **xilskey_puf_registration.h** file in the src folder under the fully expanded xilskey_puf_registration_example_1_system in the Project Explorer tab.
- Change the definition of XSK_PUF_INFO_ON_UART to **TRUE**. This setting is extremely important to verify the PUF registration completed successfully.
- Ensure the definition of XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_EFUSE is set to **TRUE**.
- Change the definition of XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_SECUREBITS to **TRUE**.
- Change the definition of XSK_PUF_SYN_WRLK to **TRUE**.
- Set the XSK_PUF_AES_KEY to the `Key 0` value in the `aes_key.nky` file.
- Set the XSK_PUF_BLACK_KEY_IV to a value that is user choice. This IV is not related to the IV created in `aes_key.nky` and can be any user generated value. This IV is used by encryption when encrypting the red key with the PUF's KEK.
- Create a file named `puf_iv.txt` with the ASCII-HEX string of the PUF IV used in XSK_PUF_BLACK_KEY_IV as this is needed during boot. Alternatively, use the one provided in the design documents in the `Keys` folder.

17. Verify all the required changes are made before continuing as shown in the figure below. The `xilskkey_puf_registration.h` file with the example keys, shown in the figure below, is included in the reference design in the `puf_registration` folder.
18. To save changes to `xilskkey_puf_registration.h` click **File** → **Save** in the main toolbar.

Figure 5: PUF Registration File Required for eFUSE

```

xilskkey_puf_registration.h
/***** Macros (Inline Functions) Definitions *****/
/* Following parameters should be configured by user */
#define XSK_PUF_INFO_ON_UART           TRUE
#define XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_EFUSE         TRUE
#define XSK_PUF_IF_CONTRACT_MANUFATURER  FALSE

/* For programming/reading secure bits of PUF */
#define XSK_PUF_READ_SECUREBITS       FALSE
#define XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_SECUREBITS    TRUE

#if (XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_SECUREBITS == TRUE)
#define XSK_PUF_SYN_INVALID           FALSE
#define XSK_PUF_SYN_WRLK             TRUE
#define XSK_PUF_REGISTER_DISABLE     FALSE
#define XSK_PUF_RESERVED             FALSE
#endif

#define XSK_PUF_AES_KEY "0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123"
#define XSK_PUF_IV "012345678901234567890123"

#define XSK_PUF_REG_MODE      XSK_PUF_MODE4K
                               /**< Registration Mode
                               * XPUF_MODE4K */
    
```


PUF Registration into eFUSES

IMPORTANT! THESE INSTRUCTIONS MODIFY THE EFUSES ON THE ZCU102 DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND MIGHT LIMIT FUTURE USE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD FOR TESTING AND DEBUGGING!

To register the PUF into the eFUSE, perform the following steps:


1. Right-click on the **platform.spr** that is located under the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform in the Explorer view and click **Open**.
2. Select **Board Support Package** under standalone on `psu_cortexa53_0` in the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform view and click **Modify BSP settings**.
3. In the Board Support Package Settings window, expand the **Overview** tree, then click **standalone** as shown in the following figure.

Figure 6: Setting Up the UART Output Using the BSP Settings




4. Ensure the stdin and stdout functions are mapped to psu_uart_0 and click **OK**.
5. In the Vitis IDE explorer view, on the left, right-click **xilskey_puf_registration_example_1_system** and select **Build Project**.
6. Turn power off to the ZCU102 board.
7. Connect either the USB JTAG connector J2 to the ZCU102 development board and then a computer or connect the platform JTAG to the ZCU102 and the associated hardware to a computer.
8. Connect a USB cable from the USB serial port connector J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and note which COM port was enumerated with the Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0.
9. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud. Enable terminal logging and select a file name and location.
10. On the ZCU102 development board, set the dip switch SW6 to configure the board for JTAG boot mode as shown in the following figure.

Figure 7: ZCU102 JTAG Boot Mode Switch



11. Power on the ZCU102 board using switch SW1.
12. Right-click `xilsky_puf_registration_example_1` → **Run As** → **Launch Hardware (Single Application Debug)** as shown in the following figure.

Figure 8: Running the PUF Registration on the ZCU102 Board



The PUF registration application starts running and outputs information to the terminal as shown in the following figure. An example log of the PUF registration is included in the design files in the `Logs` folder called `puf_registration_log.log`.

13. Verify line 12 of the UART output is the red key that was configured in `XSK_PUF_AES_KEY` in `xilskey_puf_registration.h`.
14. Verify line 13 of the UART output is the black key IV that was configured in `XSK_PUF_BLACK_KEY_IV` in `xilskey_puf_registration.h`.
 - Line 20 of the UART output is the *black key* generated by the AES encryption engine using the PUF as a KEK.
 - Line 21 shows that the *black key* was burned into eFUSEs.
 - Line 23 of the UART output is the required syndrome data that the PUF uses to regenerate its device-unique encryption key. It is the data that is being programmed into the eFUSEs.
 - Lines 31 shows that the PUF information has been burned into eFUSEs.
15. Power off the ZCU102 development board.

RSA eFUSE Configuration

 **IMPORTANT!** THESE INSTRUCTIONS MODIFY THE EFUSES ON THE ZCU102 DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND MIGHT LIMIT FUTURE USE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD FOR NON-SECURE TESTING AND DEBUGGING!

 **IMPORTANT!** Programming any of the `RSA_EN` eFUSE settings preclude AMD test access. Consequently, AMD might not accept return material authorization (RMA) requests.

RSA eFUSE Settings

RSA eFUSE registration is covered in detail in Programming eFUSEs for AES and RSA Cryptographic Functions in the *Programming BBRAM and eFUSEs* ([XAPP1319](#)), so only a summary pertaining to this application note is covered here.

1. Right-click on the **platform.spr** that is located under the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform in the Explorer view and click **Open**.
2. Select **Board Support Package** under standalone on `psu_cortexa53_0` in the platform view that opened and select the **Libraries** tab in the Operating Systems section.
3. Scroll to the bottom of the libraries tab and click **Import Examples** for the `xilskey` library.
4. Check the `xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_example` project and click **OK**. This adds the associated project to your workspace.
5. Open the `xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_input.h` file in the `src` folder under the fully expanded `xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_example_1_system` in the Project Explorer tab.
6. Change the definition of `XSK_EFUSEPS_RSA_ENABLE` to `TRUE`. This permanently forces the use of RSA authentication.
7. Change the definition of `XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK0_WR_LOCK` to `TRUE`. This prevents any modifications to the PPK0 hash stored in eFUSEs. The first set of settings are shown in the following figure:

Figure 10: Settings for RSA Authentication When Using eFUSEs - 1

```

/**
 * Following is the define to select if the user wants to program
 * Secure control bits
 */
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_AES_RD_LOCK           FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_AES_WR_LOCK           FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_ENC_ONLY               FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_BBRAM_DISABLE         FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_ERR_DISABLE           FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_JTAG_DISABLE          FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_DFT_DISABLE           FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PROG_GATE_DISABLE     FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_SECURE_LOCK           FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_RSA_ENABLE             TRUE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK0_WR_LOCK          TRUE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK0_INVLD            FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK1_WR_LOCK          FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK1_INVLD            FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_LBIST_EN              FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_LPD_SC_EN             FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_FPD_SC_EN             FALSE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PBR_BOOT_ERR          FALSE

```

8. In the next section of the configuration, change the definition of **XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_PPK0_HASH** to **TRUE**.
9. Change the definition of **XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK0_HASH** to the value stored in `sha3.txt` that was created by `bootgen` (or copied from the `Keys` directory) from the previous section.

The second set of settings is shown in [Figure 11](#). These settings using the example keys are included in the design files in the `xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_input.h` file in the `rsa_registration` folder. The second RSA authentication key (PPK1) is not written for this application note but it can be done by changing the value of `XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK1_WR_LOCK` and `XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK1_HASH`.


10. To save changes to `xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_input.h` click **File** → **Save** in the main toolbar.

11. Power on the ZCU102 board using switch SW1.
12. Right-click `xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_example_1` → **Run As** → **Launch on Hardware (Single Application Debug)**.
13. The RSA eFUSE application starts running and outputs information to the terminal as shown in [Figure 12](#). An example log of the writing the RSA eFUSEs is included in the design files in the Logs folder called `write_rsa_enable_log.log`.
14. Verify line 15 from the output terminal matches the SHA3 output that was generated and stored in the `sha3.txt` file.
15. Line 32 from the terminal matches the SHA3 output that was generated and stored in the `sha.txt` file.
 - Line 32 confirms that RSA authentication is enabled and now required for use because this was burned into the eFUSEs.
 - Line 33 shows that the PPK0 eFUSE has been programmed and the PPK0 SHA3 value cannot be changed.
16. Power off the ZCU102 development board.

1. To support the SD card storage, the xilffs library has to be added to the application BSP. Right-click on the **platform.spr** that is located under ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform in the Explorer view and click **Open**.
2. Select **Board Support Package** under standalone on psu_cortexa53_0 in the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform view and click **Modify BSP settings**.
3. Select the **xilffs** library in the Board Support Package Settings window. Click on the **xilffs** library that appears on the left in **Overview** → **standalone** and set the **enable_exfat** configuration parameter to `TRUE`. Click **OK**.

These settings are shown in the following figure:

Figure 13: Configuring Board Support Package Settings in the Vitis IDE – Standalone Library Configuration



4. Right-click the **ZCU102_XAPP1333** platform in the Explorer view, which is now marked as out-of-date, and click **Build Project**.
5. In the Vitis IDE, click **File** → **New** → **Application Project**. If the Create a New Application Project window appears, click **Next**.
6. Select the **ZCU102_XAPP1333** platform in the Platform Window and click **Next**.
7. Type in `ExternalKeyStorage` in the Application project name.
8. Leave the remaining parameters at their default value and click **Next**.
9. Leave the domain as standalone on psu_cortexa53_0. These settings are shown in [Figure 14](#), [Figure 15](#), and [Figure 16](#).
10. Select **Next**.
11. Select **Empty Application (C)**.
12. Click **Finish**.
13. Expand the **src** folder in the `ExternalKeyStorage` of the Project explorer window.
14. Right-click **src** and select **Import Sources**.
15. Click **Browse** in the File system window.

- Navigate to the ExternalKeyStorage/src folder in the reference design file directory and check all .c and .h files and then click **Finish** as shown in [Figure 17](#).

Figure 14: Creating the ExternalKeyStorage Project in the Vitis IDE- Platform Selection




Figure 16: Creating the ExternalKeyStorage Project in the Vitis IDE – Domain Selection





Figure 17: Importing Files from the Reference Design into the ExternalKeyStorage Project



17. Create a new file called `ExternalKeyStorage.bif` in the `ExternalKeyStorage` folder. This file is also included with the design files and can be copied into the project folder but the paths must be updated to point to the correct folders. Manual creation of the BIF file is necessary to use the black key during boot as the Create Boot Image tool within the Vitis IDE does not currently support this feature.
18. Update the contents of the file to the contents shown in the following figure using the correct paths.

Figure 18: ExternalKeyStorage.bif File

```


1  \//arch = zynqmp; split = false; format = BIN
2  the_ROM_image:
3  {
4      [pskfile] ../Keys/psk0.pem
5      [sskfile] ../Keys/ssk0.pem
6      [auth_params] spk_id = 0; ppk_select = 0
7      [keysrc_encryption] efuse_blk_key
8      [bh_key_iv] ../Keys/puf_iv.txt
9      [fsbl_config] puf4kmode, shutter = 0x0100005E, opt_key
10     [bootloader, destination_cpu=a53-0, encryption = aes, authentication = rsa, aeskeyfile = ../Keys/multiple_keys.nky]
11     ../ZCU104/zynqmp_fsbl/fsbl_a53.elf
12     [destination_cpu=pmu, authentication = rsa]
13     ../ZCU104/zynqmp_pmufw/pmufw.elf
14     [destination_cpu = a53-0, encryption = aes, authentication = rsa, aeskeyfile = ../Keys/multiple_keys_app.nky]
15     ./Debug/ExternalKeyStorage.elf
16 }

```

19. Build the ExternalKeyStorage project in the Vitis IDE.
20. From the command prompt in the ExternalKeyStorage folder, run the following command:

```
bootgen -p zcu9eg -arch zynqmp -image ExternalKeyStorage.bif -w -o BOOT.bin
```
21. Power off the ZCU102 board.
22. Copy `BOOT.bin` to a blank SD card.
23. Load the SD card into the J100 SD slot on the ZCU102 development board.
24. Connect a USB cable from the USB Serial port J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and make note of which COM port was enumerated with the Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0.
25. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud. Enable terminal logging and select a file name and location.

Figure 19: ZCU102 SD Boot Mode Switch Setting




X26403-031522

26. On the ZCU102 development board, set dip switch SW6 to configure the board for SD boot mode, as shown in the previous figure.
27. Load the SD card into the J100 SD slot on the ZCU102 development board.
28. Power on the ZCU102 board using switch SW1.

In the terminal program, a menu appears as shown in the following figure:

Figure 20: Main Menu of External Key Storage Demo



```

COM8 - PuTTY
Xilinx Zynq MP First Stage Boot Loader
Release 2021.2   Dec 14 2021   -   19:15:26
PMU Firmware 2021.2   Dec 14 2021   19:16:17
PMU_ROM Version: xpbr-v8.1.0-0
KKDBG: Build Dec 15 2021, 19:51:42

XILINX PUF-BASED USER KEY ENCRYPTION DEMO
=====
(1) Encrypt key
(2) Decrypt key

```

X26404-031522

29. Press 1 to encrypt a user key and to save the encrypted key to the external SD card and follow the prompts, as illustrated in [Figure 21](#).
 - a. Enter a 96-bit IV.

Note: Do not reuse IV. Per the AES-GCM standard, the IV should be a new one per every use.
 - b. Enter an 8-bit key ID. Use an ID of 42 for this key. An ID of 0 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 0, an ID of 1 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 1, ... , an ID of 255 is mapped to user eFUSE 7 bit 31.
 - c. Enter a 256-bit AES key.
 - d. Enter a file name including a file extension (for example, `Key1.key`) for the key up to 16 characters long and then press enter when complete.
30. After entering the file name, the program displays the unencrypted key blob which consists of the IV, Key's ID, and the key itself. Afterwards, the ID and AES key are encrypted using the PUF's device-unique KEK, the entire 61 byte encrypted key blob is displayed, and the entire encrypted key blob is written to the SD card.
31. Repeat the entire encryption process and encrypt another key and new IV (as per AES-GCM standard), using [step 29](#). However, select an ID that is equal to 0xFF and create a unique key file name (for example, `Key2.key`).
32. Power off the ZCU102 board.
33. Remove the SD card and insert the card into an SD card reader on a computer.
34. Using a browser or the command line, display the contents of the SD card.
35. Make sure both key files generated in [step 29](#) and [step 31](#) appear on the SD card as shown in [Figure 22](#).

Figure 21: External Key Storage Encryption




Figure 22: Directory Contents of the SD Card after Writing the Encrypted Key

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
BOOT.bin	12/15/2021 7:54 PM	BIN File	411 KB
key1.key	1/1/2010 12:00 AM	KEY File	1 KB
Key2.key	1/1/2010 12:00 AM	KEY File	1 KB

X26406-031522

- Open both keys in a hex editor and confirm that they match the encrypted key blobs displayed in the user application. KEY1.KEY is shown in the following figure and matches the output generated in Figure 21.

Figure 23: Encrypted Key Data Stored in KEY1.KEY Read from the SD Card

Offset (h)	00	02	04	06	08	0A	0C	0E	Decoded text
00000000	b123	4567	8901	2345	6789	0123	E97E	8AA7	[\#Egk.#Egk.#é~ŠŠ
00000010	E85B	B7FC	E9BC	C18A	FDB8	865D	1590	4501	è[·üé+ÁŠý,+].E.
00000020	5C01	27E9	E6EC	5CC8	6ED8	E19F	3CA1	A650	\.'éæi\Èn0áÿ<;!P
00000030	B09C	EB41	0D32	E987	D364	28C3	63A8	062E	°æA.2é+Ód(Ãc" ..

X26407-031522

37. Remove the SD card from the computer and insert the card into the ZCU102 development board.
38. Apply power to the ZCU102 development board. The menu shown in [Figure 20](#) appears.
39. Press `2` to decrypt the data that is stored externally on the SD card.
40. Type in the name of the key file and the file extension used in [step 29](#) (`Key1.key`).
 - a. The key is read from the SD card and placed into OCM for processing.
 - b. The encrypted key blob is displayed.
 - c. The decryption process of the key blob takes place and the decrypted information is displayed showing the IV, key ID, and key.
 - d. The decrypted GCM tag is compared to the GCM tag stored in the encrypted key blob and the software indicates if they match.
 - e. Lastly, the key ID is mapped to and compared to the associated bit stored in the user eFUSES and the software indicates if the IDs match. In this case, the IDs match. An ID of 0 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 0, an ID of 1 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 1, ... , an ID of 255 is mapped to user eFUSE 7 bit 31.
41. Repeat the process and decrypt the second key that was created in [step 29](#).
42. All of the same information from [step 40](#) is displayed and the key is decrypted and passes authentication. However, the software simulates ID 255 being revoked and should not be used. When ID 255 is read from a decrypted key file, the software replaces the actual value read in from User eFUSE 7, 0x0000_0000, with a simulated value of 0x8000_0000. Because bit 31 of User eFUSE 7 is now set and appears to be burned, this simulates ID 255 as being revoked. Decrypting the two test keys is shown in the following figure.

Ordering

Because of the additional screening required to ensure entropy, AMD offers two versions of the PUF, a 128-bit one (SCD #4687) and a 256-bit one (SCD #4560). In both cases, the KEK length is 256 bits. These devices require special ordering codes (SCD). The PUF is fully supported with the standard ordering codes but entropy is not guaranteed, except for development and evaluation, because there is no assurance that there is sufficient entropy in the KEK. Entropy is measured as described in *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC PUF Characterization Report (RPT236)* (available in the [Design Security Lounge](#)) which is an AMD proprietary report.

Contact your local AMD field application engineer (FAE) or sales person to obtain a copy of the report. Use of the PUF does not require third party licensing fees. However, when ordering Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoCs with guaranteed entropy, keep in mind that SCD #4560 and SCD #4687 add additional costs. Reach out to your AMD FAE and/or sales team for additional details.

Conclusion

This application note guides you in how to use the PUF's device-unique encryption key with the AES-GCM hardware to encrypt user generated data and store the encrypted data externally. The encrypted data can then be read from external storage and decrypted using the AES-GCM hardware with the PUF's device-unique key. In addition, this application note shows how to perform data validation of decrypted data packets by using values stored in the user programmable section of eFUSES.

Reference Design

Download the [reference design files](#) for this application note from the AMD website.

Reference Design Matrix

The following checklist indicates the procedures used for the provided reference design.

Table 1: Reference Design Matrix

Parameter	Description
General	
Developer name	Jim Wesselkamper, Nathan Menhorn, Krzysztof Kepa
Target devices	Zynq UltraScale+ devices
Source code provided?	Y
Source code format (if provided)	C
Design uses code or IP from existing reference design, application note, third party or Vivado software? If yes, list.	
Simulation	
Functional simulation performed	N
Timing simulation performed?	N
Test bench provided for functional and timing simulation?	N
Test bench format	N/A

Table 1: Reference Design Matrix (cont'd)

Parameter	Description
Simulator software and version	N/A
SPICE/IBIS simulations	N/A
Implementation	
Synthesis software tools/versions used	Vivado synthesis
Implementation software tool(s) and version	Vitis IDE 2021.2
Static timing analysis performed?	N
Hardware Verification	
Hardware verified?	Y
Platform used for verification	ZCU102 evaluation board

Finding Additional Documentation

Technical Information Portal

The AMD Technical Information Portal is an online tool that provides robust search and navigation for documentation using your web browser. To access the Technical Information Portal, go to <https://docs.amd.com>.

Documentation Navigator

Documentation Navigator (DocNav) is an installed tool that provides access to AMD Adaptive Computing documents, videos, and support resources, which you can filter and search to find information. To open DocNav:

- From the AMD Vivado™ IDE, select **Help** → **Documentation and Tutorials**.
- On Windows, click the **Start** button and select **Xilinx Design Tools** → **DocNav**.
- At the Linux command prompt, enter `docnav`.

Note: For more information on DocNav, refer to the *Documentation Navigator User Guide (UG968)*.

Design Hubs

AMD Design Hubs provide links to documentation organized by design tasks and other topics, which you can use to learn key concepts and address frequently asked questions. To access the Design Hubs:

- In DocNav, click the **Design Hubs View** tab.
- Go to the [Design Hubs](#) web page.

Appendix A

Creating the Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Board Hardware Design

1. Open the Vivado Design Suite.
2. In the Quick Start tab, click **Create Project**.
3. Click **Next** in the Create a New Vivado Project page.
4. Enter `ZCU102` in the Project name.
5. Enter or select an appropriate working directory in the Project location.
6. Click **Next** on the Project Name page.
7. In Project Type, select **RTL Project** and uncheck two boxes for **Do not specify sources at this time** and **Project is an extensible Vitis platform**.
8. Click **Next** on the Project Type page.
9. Click **Next** on the Add Sources page.
10. Click **Next** on the Add Constraints (optional) page.
11. On the Default Part page, click the **Boards** tab.
12. Type in `ZCU102` in the Search.
13. Click the Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Board.
14. Click **Next** on the Default Part page.
15. Click **Finish** on the New Project Summary page and wait while the project is being created.
16. In the Project Manager tab located on the left of the Vivado workspace, click **IP INTEGRATOR** → **Create Block Design**.
17. When the Create Block Design window appears, type in `ZCU102` in Design name. Leave everything else set to default.
18. Click **OK** and wait while the design is created.
19. In the Diagram section of the workspace, located on the top right, click the + button to add IP.
20. When the Search box appears, type in `ZYNQ`.
21. Double-click **Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC** and wait while the part is added to the design.
22. Click **Run Block Automation** at the top of the Diagram window.
23. After the Run Block Automation window appears, select **All Automation** and **Apply Board Preset**, click **OK** and wait while the automation takes place.
24. Double-click the Zynq UltraScale+ part in the Diagram window.
25. Click **Page Navigator** → **PS-PL Configuration**, located on the left of the Zynq UltraScale+ (3.3) window.

26. Click **PS-PL Interfaces** located in the PS-PL Configuration window.
27. Click **Master Interface** and uncheck the **AXI HPM0 FPD** and **AXI HPM1 FPD** parameters.
28. Click **OK** to close the window.
29. Press **F6** to validate the design.
30. Click **OK** when the Validate Design window opens indicating the validation was successful.
31. In the BLOCK DESIGN window, click the **Sources** tab in the upper left-hand corner.
32. Right-click **ZCU102** under Design Sources and select **Create HDL Wrapper**.
33. When the Create HDL Wrapper window opens, click **Let Vivado manage wrapper and auto-update**, then click **OK** and wait while the sources are created.
34. In the BLOCK DESIGN window in the upper left corner on the Sources tab, expand the **ZCU102_wrapper**.
35. Right-click **ZCU102_i: ZCU102** and select **Generate Output Products**.
36. Leave the default settings in the Generate Output Products window. Click **Generate** and wait while the IP is being generated.
37. Click **OK** when the Generate Output Products window displays *Out-of-context module run was launched for generating output products*.

Exporting the ZCU102 Hardware and Launching Vitis IDE

1. In the main Vivado Design Suite toolbar select **File** → **Export** → **Export Hardware**.
2. Click **Next** in the Export Hardware Platform window.
3. Select **Pre-synthesis output** and then click **Next** in Output window.
4. Leave the XSA file name and location default values and click **Next** in Files window.
5. Click **Finish** in Exporting Hardware Platform window.
6. In the main Vivado Design Suite toolbar select **Tools** → **Launch** → **Vitis IDE**.
7. If the Vitis IDE Launcher window opens, in the workspace, provide the appropriate working directory to create a Vitis IDE workspace and click **Launch**.
8. In the Welcome tab click **Create Platform Project** under the Project column. If no Welcome tab is present, in the main toolbar, click **File** → **New** → **Platform Project**.
9. Type in `ZCU102_XAPP1333` as the platform project name in the Create new platform window and click **Next**.
10. In Hardware Specification section of the Platform window, click **Browse** to search the XSA file location.
11. In the Create Platform from XSA window, navigate to the location that was provided in [step 3](#), select the previously exported XSA file, and click **Open**. Back in the Hardware Specification section of the Platform window the file appears in the XSA File selection.

12. Leave the other settings with default values, and then click **Finish**. After importing the hardware, you should see a project named ZCU102_XAPP1333 that was automatically created based upon the ZCU102 evaluation board. The platform is marked out-of-date because the software components are not yet built by the Vitis IDE.
13. To build the platform in the Vitis IDE, select the ZCU102 XAPP1333 platform in the explorer view on the upper left side, and in the main toolbar click **Project** → **Build Project**.

Validate the Hardware and Software with the Hello World Application

1. In the main Vitis IDE toolbar, select **File** → **New** → **Application Project**. If the Create a New Application Project window appears, click **Next**.
2. Select **ZCU102_XAPP1333** platform in the Platform window and then click **Next**.
3. In the Application Project Details type in `HelloWorld` in the Application project name. Leave the remaining parameters at their default value and click **Next**.
4. Leave the domain as standalone on `psu_cortexa53_0` and click **Next**.
5. On the Template page of the New Project window, select **Hello World**.
6. Click **Finish**.
7. Right-click on the **platform.spr** that is located under the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform in the Explorer view and click **Open**.
8. Select **Board Support Package Settings** under standalone on `psu_cortexa53_0` in the ZCU102_XAPP1333 platform view and click **Modify BSP settings**.
9. In the Board Support Package Settings window expand the **Overview** tree and then click **standalone**.
10. Make sure the `stdin` and `stdout` functions are mapped to `psu_uart_0` and click **OK**.
11. Right-click the **HelloWorld** project and select **Build Project**.
12. Connect either the USB JTAG connector J2 to the ZCU102 development board and then to a computer or connect the Platform JTAG to the ZCU102 via J8 and the associated hardware to a computer.
13. Connect a USB cable from the USB Serial port connector J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and make note of which COM port was enumerated with the Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0.
14. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud.
15. On the ZCU102 development board, set the dip switch to configure the board for JTAG boot mode as shown in [Figure 7](#).
16. Right-click the **HelloWorld** project and select **Run As** → **Launch on Hardware (Single)**.
17. Verify that “Hello World” is output on the terminal screen. The hardware and software is properly configured and is now ready for use.

References

These documents provide supplemental material useful with this application note:

1. [Design Security Lounge](#)
2. *Zynq UltraScale+ Device Technical Reference Manual* ([UG1085](#))
3. *Programming BBRAM and eFUSEs* ([XAPP1319](#))
4. *Developing Tamper-Resistant Designs with Zynq UltraScale+ Devices* ([XAPP1323](#))
5. *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial* ([UG1209](#))
6. *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC PUF Characterization Report* (RPT236). Available in [Design Security Lounge](#).
7. [NIST Special Publication \(SP\) 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode \(GCM\)](#)

Revision History

The following table shows the revision history for this document.

Section	Revision Summary
06/20/2025 Version 1.3	
AES Key Generation	Restructured into multiple steps for clarity.
Introduction	Updated Figure 2 and Figure 3 .
PUF Registration into eFUSEs	Updated figure in Step 12.
PUF Encryption Decryption Demo Application	Updated titles for Figure 13 , Figure 14 , Figure 15 , and Figure 16 .
Ordering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarified information about third party licensing. • Added information about additional costs for SCD #4560 for 256-bit guaranteed entropy and SCD #4687 for 128-bit guaranteed entropy.
Finding Additional Documentation	Updated topic title.
04/12/2022 Version 1.2	
Throughout document	Updated SDK information to Vitis IDE across all content.
Introduction	Updated two block diagrams.
PUF eFUSE Configuration	Added one new figure, replaced two and removed one.
PUF Encryption and Decryption	Added two new figures, replaced six and removed two.
Ordering	Updated SDK steps to Vitis IDE steps and removed sub-section: Creating the First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL) and Board Support Package (BSP).
05/28/2021 Version 1.1	
Introduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Added a note for further clarity about boot header permissibility. • Added a note about the PUF Key.
06/26/2018 Version 1.0	
Initial release.	N/A

Please Read: Important Legal Notices

The information presented in this document is for informational purposes only and may contain technical inaccuracies, omissions, and typographical errors. The information contained herein is subject to change and may be rendered inaccurate for many reasons, including but not limited to product and roadmap changes, component and motherboard version changes, new model and/or product releases, product differences between differing manufacturers, software changes, BIOS flashes, firmware upgrades, or the like. Any computer system has risks of security vulnerabilities that cannot be completely prevented or mitigated. AMD assumes no obligation to update or otherwise correct or revise this information. However, AMD reserves the right to revise this information and to make changes from time to time to the content hereof without obligation of AMD to notify any person of such revisions or changes. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS." AMD MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTENTS HEREOF AND ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY INACCURACIES, ERRORS, OR OMISSIONS THAT MAY APPEAR IN THIS INFORMATION. AMD SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT WILL AMD BE LIABLE TO ANY PERSON FOR ANY RELIANCE, DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, OR OTHER CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, EVEN IF AMD IS EXPRESSLY ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

AUTOMOTIVE APPLICATIONS DISCLAIMER

AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS (IDENTIFIED AS "XA" IN THE PART NUMBER) ARE NOT WARRANTED FOR USE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF AIRBAGS OR FOR USE IN APPLICATIONS THAT AFFECT CONTROL OF A VEHICLE ("SAFETY APPLICATION") UNLESS THERE IS A SAFETY CONCEPT OR REDUNDANCY FEATURE CONSISTENT WITH THE ISO 26262 AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARD ("SAFETY DESIGN"). CUSTOMER SHALL, PRIOR TO USING OR DISTRIBUTING ANY SYSTEMS THAT INCORPORATE PRODUCTS, THOROUGHLY TEST SUCH SYSTEMS FOR SAFETY PURPOSES. USE OF PRODUCTS IN A SAFETY APPLICATION WITHOUT A SAFETY DESIGN IS FULLY AT THE RISK OF CUSTOMER, SUBJECT ONLY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING LIMITATIONS ON PRODUCT LIABILITY.

Copyright

© Copyright 2018–2025 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. AMD, the AMD Arrow logo, UltraScale+, Vitis, Vivado, Zynq, and combinations thereof are trademarks of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. AMBA, AMBA Designer, Arm, ARM1176JZ-S, CoreSight, Cortex, PrimeCell, Mali, and MPCore are trademarks of Arm Limited in the US and/or elsewhere. Other product names used in this publication are for identification purposes only and may be trademarks of their respective companies.